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TEJAS N. NARECHANIA*
Abstract: The Federal Communications Commission’s latest 
network neutrality regulations, released in 2015, have been 
the subject of compliment and critique by a varied set of 
politicians, industry leaders, and scholars. But a potentially 
surprising font of criticism for these new rules lies within the 
administration itself: During the FCC’s rule-making 
proceeding, the Federal Trade Commission cautioned that 
the FCC could undermine the FTC’s authority to sanction 
unfair and anticompetitive conduct in broadband industries 
by activating its powers under Title II of the 
Communications Act. Simultaneously, members of the FTC 
argued that it, rather than the FCC, was better suited to 
address network neutrality harms. This interagency 
competition gives rise to a novel, descriptive account of 
executive coordination among independent agencies: The 
White House responded to the network neutrality 
proceeding with comments strongly supporting the use of 
Title II powers—effectively favoring the allocation of 
authority to the FCC. The White House’s intervention is 
analogous in many respects to the resolution of other 
interagency disputes, but takes places among independent, 
rather than executive, agencies. Moreover, the choice to 
favor the FCC over the FTC has important effects on the 
substantive choice between communications regulation and 
the more general (and thus less specific) principles of the 
antitrust laws.  
* This Essay is adapted from my remarks at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of
Law symposium on The Future of Internet Regulation, which I delivered when I served as 
the Julius Silver Research Fellow at Columbia Law School. My thanks go to Peter Shane for 
the invitation to the symposium and, especially, for his thoughtful comments on this essay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In May 2014, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
launched a network neutrality rule-making proceeding in response to 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Verizon v. FCC.1 To say that the 
Commission’s proceeding sparked a debate would be a vast 
understatement: The FCC’s proposal2 caused the agency to confront a 
record larger than had ever been amassed in its history.3  
 Among the many submissions to the FCC, some stand out. The 
White House, for example, expressly asked the FCC to “implement the 
strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”4 Specifically, the 
Obama Administration urged the FCC to “reclassify consumer 
broadband service” as a telecommunications service, thereby making 
it subject to the provisions of Title II of the Communications Act.5 
Indeed, the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order issued regulations that 
rely primarily on these Title II powers.6  
 The White House was not the only section of the federal 
government to file comments with the FCC. The Federal Trade 
1 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
2 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5564 (2014) (notice of 
proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter 2014 Open Internet NPRM]. 
3 See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5603–04 (2015) 
(report and order on remand, declaratory ruling, and order) [hereinafter 2015 Open 
Internet Order]. 
4 The Obama Administration’s comments were conveyed through the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency within the 
Department of Commerce that is charged with developing Executive Branch 
telecommunications policy. 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)(H) (2012). NTIA’s filing does not add 
any policy views, other than those of the President. Compare Letter from Lawrence E. 
Strickling, Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., Dep’t of Commerce, to Marlene Dortch, 
Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n on Ex Parte Filing 3 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with the FCC), 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=60000979242 [hereinafter Letter on Ex Parte 
Filing], and 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 5603, with Net Neutrality: 
President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality (last visited May 2015). Indeed, NTIA often 
serves as the conduit between the President and the FCC. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. 
Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 86 
(2008). 
5 Letter on Ex Parte Filing, supra note 4, at 3. 
6 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at 5603, 5614-16. 
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Commission (FTC) also opined on the possible exercise of the FCC’s 
Title II powers. It, however, had a starkly different take: The FTC 
cautioned the FCC against invoking authority under Title II of the Act, 
noting that to do so would curtail the FTC’s authority to sanction 
unfair conduct by broadband carriers.7 Some members of the FTC 
went further, suggesting that it, rather than the FCC, was “particularly 
well suited for . . . addressing the important issues raised in the net 
neutrality debate.”8 Viewed altogether, the FTC seemed to suggest that 
it was the better agency for addressing network neutrality-related 
7 Comment of the Federal Trade Commission (filed Sept. 19, 2014), Inquiry Concerning the 
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable 
and Timely Fashion, 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of Inquiry on 
Immediate Action to Accelerate Deployment, 30 FCC Rcd. 1375 (2015) (notice of inquiry) 
(FCC Docket No. 15-10), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/federal-trade-
commission-comment-federal-communications-commission-regarding-privacy-
security/140919privacybroadband.pdf; see also Edward Wyatt, Edith Ramirez Is Raising 
the FTC’s Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2014 (noting, by citing the comment supra, that the 
“FTC has recently warned . . . that the FCC’s net neutrality ruling might infringe on the 
trade commission’s ability to protect consumers[]”); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC 
Provides Comment to Federal Communications Commission on Consumer Privacy and 
Data Security Issues and Broadband Internet Services (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/ftc-provides-comment-federal-
communications-commission-consumer (noting that the FTC voted unanimously to file the 
comment cited supra). 
8 Net Neutrality: Is Antitrust Law More Effective Than Regulation in Protecting Consumers 
and Innovation?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and 
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (June 20, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409571/140620antitrust
testimony.pdf [hereinafter Wright 2014 Testimony] (statement of Joshua D. Wright, 
Former Comm’r of FTC); Brian Fung, The FTC Doubles Down on Its Net Neutrality 
Ambitions, THE SWITCH-WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/29/the-ftc-doubles-
down-on-its-net-neutrality-ambitions (noting comments by Commissioner Ohlhausen that 
“reflect a belief in antitrust law to police Internet providers”); see also Hon. Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen, The FCC’s Knowledge Problem: How to Protect Consumers Online, 67 FED. 
COMMC’NS L.J. 203, 212–14, 229–31 (2015); Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, FTC, Broadband 
Policy & Consumer Welfare: The Case for an Antitrust Approach to Net Neutrality Issues at 
the Information Economy Project’s Conference on US Broadband Markets at George 
Mason University School of Law (Apr. 19, 2013), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/broadband-policy-
consumer-welfare-case-antitrust-approach-net-neutrality-
issues/130423wright_nn_posting_final.pdf (“[T]he FTC’s core competencies as an 
antitrust and consumer protection agency make it equal to the task [of addressing the 
concerns raised in the longstanding debate surrounding net neutrality].”) [hereinafter 
Wright BPCW Speech]; Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, FTC, Net Neutrality Meets Regulatory 
Economics 101 (Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Wright 2015 Speech]. 
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harms—but warned that reclassification would upend the FTC’s 
jurisdiction over broadband Internet access.  
 The White House’s intercession into the network neutrality 
proceeding, set against the backdrop of this interagency conflict, 
provides a novel account of executive coordination among 
independent agencies. The White House’s intervention into the 
dispute between the FCC and the FTC echoes a form of presidential 
coordination that is typically seen as reserved for executive—rather 
than independent—agencies.9 To be sure, there is little that is unusual 
about presidential advocacy before independent agencies, such as the 
FTC and the FCC.10 Yet, it is significant that the White House not only 
propounded a particular policy outcome, but it also helped to resolve a 
conflict among these agencies by implicitly favoring the allocation of 
substantive authority to the FCC. 
 Moreover, the specific choice to vest network neutrality 
jurisdiction with the FCC has implications for the long-running 
competition between antitrust enforcement and industrial 
regulation.11 The decision to activate the FCC’s power to regulate 
broadband providers as common carriers, indeed, undermines the 
FTC’s jurisdiction,12 and likely affects the permissible scope of 
antitrust enforcement.13 Yet the preference for such regulation also 
reflects a sensible policy view. Modern antitrust doctrine is not ideally 
suited to counter the competition harms that network neutrality 
regulation has historically targeted. Rather, the specific market 
conditions associated with broadband carriage and Internet 
applications suggest that the industry presents an appropriate 
candidate for regulation. 
9 See Kirti Datla & Richard Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013) (noting “a sort of constitutional force field 
around independent agencies”). 
10 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (Social Science Research Network, Research Paper No. 12, 2015); Peter 
M. Shane, ‘Undue Influence?’ Congressional Attacks on FCC-White House Links, BNA 
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 3. 2015, http://www.bna.com/undue-influence-congressional-
n17179923581. 
11 See generally, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 233 (1982); 
ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 9 (1971). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (excepting common carriers from the FTC’s jurisdiction). 
13 See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007) (interpreting 
regulatory regime as “implicitly precluding the application of the antitrust laws”); Verizon 
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004). 
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I.     INTERAGENCY COMPETITION 
 It is an open secret that the FCC and the FTC have engaged in an 
ongoing jurisdictional battle over the authority to regulate 
broadband.14 The significant overlap between the agencies’ domains 
has caused them to compete over the authority to regulate the unfair 
billing practices of telephone and broadband carriers; data security 
and privacy; and, more recently, network neutrality. The gradual swell 
of these interagency disputes, cresting with the FTC’s view of network 
neutrality regulation by the FCC, provides important context to the 
White House’s intervention in the FCC’s regulatory proceeding. 
 The interagency clash between the FTC and FCC dates to the 
regulation of telephone service. For example, over a decade ago, the 
two agencies sparred over the authority to enforce the “Do-Not-Call” 
registry, which allows telephone subscribers to opt-out of 
telemarketing calls.15  
 More recently, both agencies have asserted the authority to police 
unfair billing practices by telephone operators. Both the FTC and the 
FCC have sanctioned wireless companies for adding “unauthorized 
charges on . . . [a customer’s] telephone bill”—a practice known in 
14 E.g., David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: 
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1466 n.91 
(2014) (citing Reconsidering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and 
Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement 
of William E. Kovacic, Comm’r, FTC) (“The deployment of broadband has triggered a 
struggle between the Federal Communications Commission and the FTC over which 
agency will exercise regulatory authority for this technology.”)); Wyatt, supra note 7 
(noting tension and turf battles between the FTC and the FCC); see also Kathryn Bachman, 
FCC vs. FTC — A New Privacy Turf War, KATY ON THE HILL, Mar. 30, 2015, 
http://katyonthehill.com/fcc-vs-ftc-a-new-privacy-turf-war; Erin Mershon, The Latest 
Tech Turf War: FCC vs. FTC, POLITICO MORNING TECH., Oct. 30, 2014, 
http://www.politico.com/morningtech/1014/morningtech15888.html; Jeff John Roberts, 
Why a DC Turf War May Have Played a Part in the Timing of the FTC’s Mobile Data 
Lawsuit Against AT&T, GIGAOM, Oct. 28, 2014, https://gigaom.com/2014/10/28/why-a-
dc-turf-war-may-have-played-a-part-in-the-timing-of-the-ftcs-mobile-data-lawsuit-
against-att. Indeed, these jurisdictional battles have lingered for over decade. See 
Vanderbilt University Press, “Do Not Call” Controversy Likely to Turn Into Agency Turf 
Battle, NEWSWISE, Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.newswise.com/articles/do-not-
call-controversy-likely-to-turn-into-agency-turf-battle (recounting interview with 
Professor Christopher S. Yoo). 
15 Vanderbilt University, supra note 14 (noting the possibility of a “turf battle over whether 
the do not call list will be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal 
Communications Commission”). For details on the Do-Not-Call Registry, see 15 U.S.C. § 
6151 (2012) and 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2015). 
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industry jargon as “cramming.”16 In October 2014, the FTC and the 
FCC jointly reached a $105 million settlement with AT&T for alleged 
cramming violations.17 Meanwhile, the FCC pursued additional 
actions against T-Mobile to the tune of $90 million,18 and against 
Verizon and Sprint for a combined $158 million.19 While some of this 
work between the agencies was almost certainly cooperative,20 as in 
the case of joint settlement with AT&T,21 officials also admitted to 
some interagency “tension” as each “bulk[ed] up enforcement efforts” 
in these matters.22  
16 Cramming - Unauthorized Charges on Your Phone Bill, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/guides/cramming-unauthorized-misleading-or-
deceptive-charges-placed-your-telephone-bill (last visited June 2015). 
17 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, FTC v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014); AT&T Mobility LLC 
Unauthorized Third Party Billing Charges, 29 FCC Rcd. 11803 (2014) (order); see also 
Press Release, FTC, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for Consumer Refunds in Mobile 
Cramming Case (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case; Press 
Release, FCC, AT&T Mobility to Pay $105 Million to Settle Wireless Cramming and Truth-
in-Billing Investigation (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329830A1.pdf. 
18 T-Mobile USA, Inc. Unauthorized Third Party Billing Charges, 29 FCC Rcd. 15111 (2014) 
(order); see also Press Release, FCC, T-Mobile to Pay $90 Million to Settle Investigation 
into Mobile Cramming and Truth-In-Billing Practices (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-331156A1.pdf. 
19 Cellco P’ship Verizon Wireless Unauthorized Third Party Billing Charges, 30 FCC Rcd. 
4590 (2015) (order); Sprint Corp. Unauthorized Third Party Billing Charges, 30 FCC Rcd. 
4575 (2015) (order); see also Press Release, FCC, Verizon & Sprint to Pay $158 Million to 
Settle Mobile Cramming Investigations (May, 12, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-333427A1.pdf. 
20 Indeed, all the settlements included cooperation from state attorneys general, and the 
settlements with Verizon and Sprint also included participation from the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau. See, e.g., Press Release, FCC, Verizon & Sprint to Pay $158 
Million to Settle Mobile Cramming Investigations (May 12, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-333427A1.pdf (“The settlements 
were negotiated in coordination with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the 
attorneys general of all 50 states and the District of Columbia.”). 
21 E.g., Press Release, FCC, AT&T Mobility to Pay $105 Million to Settle Wireless 
Cramming and Truth-in-Billing Investigation (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329830A1.pdf (“This settlement, a 
joint effort between the FCC, FTC and all 50 states and the District of Columbia, is a prime 
example of government agencies working together on behalf of American consumers.”). 
22 Mershon, supra note 14. 
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 The FTC and the FCC have also sparred over their jurisdictional 
border on matters that extend beyond telephone regulation and unfair 
billing practices. The FTC, for example, is often thought to be the 
“most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United 
States.”23 Strikingly, however, it is the FCC—not the FTC—that has 
imposed the largest civil penalty for a consumer privacy violation: In 
2015, AT&T paid $25 million to settle allegations that employees in its 
call centers illicitly accessed the personal information of almost 
280,000 U.S. customers.24 The FCC’s privacy-related settlement with 
AT&T follows shortly after similar actions against other telephone 
carriers, including Verizon, in late 2014.25 
 Some commentators have suggested that the FCC’s data privacy- 
and security-related enforcement actions rankled the FTC, causing it 
to respond in-kind by taking the lead against “misdeeds [that 
normally] fall to its sister agency.”26 Specifically, the FTC sued AT&T 
over its practice of throttling27 wireless broadband service when an 
“unlimited mobile data plan customer exceeds the limit set by [AT&T] 
during a billing cycle,” alleging that such conduct constituted a 
 
 
 
 
23 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (2014). 
24 AT&T Services, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 2808 (2015) (order); see also Press Release, FCC, 
AT&T to Pay $25 Million to Settle Consumer Privacy Investigation (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332911A1.pdf. As noted supra, 
AT&T paid $25 million to resolve the FCC’s investigation. Prior to that, the largest such 
penalty was $22.5 million—paid by Google to resolve a FTC investigation. See Solove & 
Hartzog, supra note 23, at 605. 
25 Verizon Compliance with the Commission's Rules and Regulations Governing Customer 
Proprietary Network Information, 29 FCC Rcd. 10303 (2014) (adopting order); Terracom, 
Inc. and Yourtel America, Inc., 29 FCC Rcd. 13325 (2014) (notice of apparent liability for 
forfeiture); see also Press Release, FCC, FCC Plans $10 Million Fine for Carriers that 
Breached Consumer Privacy (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-330136A1.pdf. 
26 Roberts, supra note 14; see also Brendan Sasso, Net Neutrality Has Sparked an 
Interagency Squabble Over Internet Privacy, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Mar. 9, 2015, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/the-future-of-broadband/net-neutrality-has-
sparked-an-interagency-squabble-over-internet-privacy-20150309. 
27 In this context, throttling means slowing. See 47 C.F.R. § 8.7 (2015) (Throttling means to 
“impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic.”); 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at ¶ 
120 (The no-throttling rule bans conduct that “inhibits the delivery of particular content . . 
.”.). 
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violation of the FTC Act.28 Only a few months before the FTC filed its 
complaint, the FCC launched an informal investigation into Verizon’s 
plans to similarly throttle Internet access for those consumers 
subscribing to “unlimited” plans that used an unusually large amount 
of data.29 That is, both the FTC and the FCC each targeted similar 
broadband-related conduct by wireless carriers. And commentators 
remarked that the FTC’s actions may have been motivated not only by 
the desire to ensure that “companies liv[e] up to the commitments 
they make,” but also “to undermine the FCC.”30 
 Much of this interagency competition occurred against the 
backdrop of the FCC’s network neutrality proceeding. In January 
2014, the D.C. Circuit invalidated much of the FCC’s 2010 Open 
Internet Order and the network neutrality rules contained therein.31 
On remand, the FCC opened a new regulatory docket and approved a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought comment on a variety of 
alternative legal bases for new network neutrality regulations.32 In 
particular, the FCC sought comment on Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,33 on Title II of the Communications 
Act,34 and on several “hybrid” proposals.35 The FCC’s proceeding 
28 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, 
LLC, 87 F.Supp.3d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. C-14-4785 EMC), 2014 WL 5454646. 
29 Letter from Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, to Daniel S. Mead, President and CEO, 
Verizon Wireless (July 30, 2014), available at http://cdn1.vox-
cdn.com/assets/4837852/FCCLettertoVerizon.pdf. 
30 Roberts, supra note 14. Interestingly, the FCC would eventually also target AT&T’s 
throttling practices: In June 2015, the FCC announced plans to fine AT&T $100 million for 
failing to adequately notify customers subscribing to unlimited data plans that their 
Internet access could be throttled based on usage. AT&T Mobility, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 6613 
(2015) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture and order); see also Press Release, FCC, 
FCC Plans to Fine AT&T $100 Million for Misleading Consumers About Unlimited Data 
Plans, Violating Transparency Obligations (June 17, 2015), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0617/DOC-
333877A1.pdf. Perhaps notably, the FCC specifically alleges that AT&T violated the aspects 
of the 2010 Open Internet (network neutrality) Order that survived scrutiny in Verizon v. 
FCC. Id. 
31 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating most, but not all, of Preserving 
the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010) (report and order)). 
32 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 2. 
33 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
34 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2012). 
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sparked a nationwide debate, as nearly four million citizens, 
corporations, and advocacy organizations, among others, filed 
comments with the FCC.  
 Notably, the FTC was among the many interested parties to 
comment on the FCC’s choice among substantive rules and bases of 
legal authority.36 In particular, the FTC emphasized that its own 
oversight “promotes competition” and “provides an incentive for 
companies to act responsibly and fairly;” and the FTC further 
described several successful enforcement actions against Internet-
related companies under Section 5 of the FTC Act.37 Indeed, the FTC 
squarely asserts its Section 5 authority in its complaint against AT&T’s 
throttling practice38 (itself a network neutrality matter39).  
 But the FTC’s comment also explicitly noted that its continued 
jurisdiction over broadband carriers hinged on the FCC’s regulatory 
decisions: If the FCC were to classify broadband carriers as common 
carriers (thereby invoking Title II of the Communications Act), the 
FTC’s Section 5 jurisdiction would practically evaporate.40 Stated 
simply, the FTC emphasized its success in “requir[ing] companies to 
market their products truthfully and to refrain from engaging in 
harmful business practices,” but warned that the FCC could 
35 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 151-52; see also Tejas N. Narechania & 
Tim Wu, Sender Side Transmission Rules for the Internet, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 467 (2014). 
36 Technically, the FTC’s comment (discussed in detail above) was filed in a parallel, but 
closely related, proceeding. See Comment of the FTC, supra note 7, at 1. Nevertheless, the 
FTC’s filing was widely seen as a comment on the FCC’s network neutrality proposals. See 
Wyatt, supra note 7; Brian Fung, The FCC Wants to Police Your Internet Provider. But So 
Does the FTC., THE SWITCH-WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/23/both-the-fcc-and-
the-ftc-want-to-police-your-internet-provider. 
37 Comment of FTC, supra note 7, at 3-4. 
38 Complaint, supra note 28. 
39 AT&T Mobility, LLC, 30 FCC Rcd. 6613 (2015) (notice of apparent liability for forfeiture 
and order); see also Press Release, FCC, FCC Plans to Fine AT&T $100 Million for 
Misleading Consumers About Unlimited Data Plans, Violating Transparency Obligations 
(June 17, 2015), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0617/DOC-
333877A1.pdf (alleging that AT&T violated the transparency provisions of the 
Commission’s 2010 network neutrality rules). 
40 Id. at 3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 44, 45(a)(2) (2012)). 
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undermine these accomplishments if it pursued a regulatory path that 
relied on Title II of the Communications Act.41 
 Some individual members of the FTC offered further thoughts on 
the FCC’s options for network neutrality regulation. Commissioner 
Ohlhausen, for example, has expressed serious concern that the FCC’s 
approach could truncate the FTC’s regulatory jurisdiction.42 Moreover, 
in statements that preceded the release of the 2014 Open Internet 
NPRM and postdated the 2015 Open Internet Order, Commissioner 
Ohlhausen argued explicitly that the FTC is best equipped to address 
network neutrality harms.43 Commissioner Wright echoed these 
sentiments: In testimony before Congress, Commissioner Wright 
stated that the FTC was “particularly well suited for . . . addressing the 
important issues raised in the net neutrality debate.”44 To be sure, 
some past and present members of the FTC seemed to believe that the 
agency was ill-suited to address the harms that network neutrality 
regulation aimed to resolve,45 and seemed glad to cede authority to the 
41 Id. 
42 Ohlhausen, supra note 8, at 229–31; see also Fung, supra note 8 (noting comments by 
Commissioner Ohlhausen that “reflect a belief in antitrust law to police Internet 
providers”); Sasso, supra note 26. 
43 Ohlhausen, supra note 8, at 205 (“To the extent the government is involved, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) model of enforcement, advocacy, and industry and consumer 
education is the better model . . . .”); Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Net Neutrality vs. Net 
Reality: Why an Evidence-Based Approach to Enforcement, And Not More Regulation, 
Could Protect Innovation on the Web, 14 ENGAGE 81 (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/telecommunications-
electronic-media-net-neutrality-vs.net-reality-why-evidence-based-approach-
enforcement-not-more-regulation-could-protect-innovation-
web/140204ohlhausennetneutrality.pdf; see also Harry Phillips, Ohlhausen: FTC Best 
Placed to Ensure Net Neutrality, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, Feb. 7, 2014, available at 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/35198/ohlhausen-ftc-best-placed-
ensure-net-neutrality (“The US Federal Trade Commission, rather than any other 
regulator, is in the best position to ensure that internet service providers are not harming 
consumers by discriminating against rivals’ content, FTC commissioner Maureen 
Ohlhausen said in a speech . . ..”). 
44 Wright 2014 Testimony, supra note 8; Wright BPCW Speech, supra note 8 (“[T]he FTC’s 
core competencies as an antitrust and consumer protection agency make it equal to the 
task [of addressing the concerns raised in the longstanding debate surrounding net 
neutrality.]”); Wright 2015 Speech, supra note 8. 
45 For the views of former Commissioners, see J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Some Reflections on the Future of the Internet: Net Neutrality, Online Behavioral 
Advertising, and Health Information Technology, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Telecommunications & Ecommerce Committee Fall Meeting (Oct. 26, 2009);   
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FCC.46 Yet, the agency’s official comment to the FCC and the public 
statements of at least two of its Commissioners are suggestive of a 
shift towards a more intense interagency competition for the mantle 
of network neutrality. 
II. EXECUTIVE COORDINATION 
 This conflict between the FCC and the FTC adds important context 
to another notable filing in the network neutrality docket. In 
November 2014, the White House itself intervened into the FCC’s 
proceeding. Notably, President Obama explicitly asked the agency to 
“implement the strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality,” 
urging the FCC to classify broadband providers as common carriers 
and invoke its powers under Title II of the Communications Act.47 
 The FCC would take the White House’s advice: In its final order, 
the FCC issued regulations that closely hew to the policies outlined in 
the President’s statement, and the Commission grounded these rules 
in the authority conferred by Title II.48 Commentators noted that the 
White House’s intervention seemed to have charted the course for the 
FCC’s network neutrality regulations, setting aside other 
alternatives.49 Set against the backdrop of the interagency competition 
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Broadband Access Policy: The Role of 
Antitrust, Remarks at the Broadband Policy Summit IV: Navigating the Digital Revolution 
(June 13, 2008) (“I doubt that antitrust can address many, if any, of the problems cited by 
network neutrality proponents.”); Federal Trade Commission, Broadband Connectivity 
Competition Policy (June 2007) (Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, concurring) (“[T]here is little 
chance that antitrust would prevent such a scheme [as the one in Madison River case] 
except after a ‘rule of reason’ analysis, which — at least in these types of cases — is likely to 
be drawn out, uncertain and expensive.”). For views of Commissioners sitting at the time of 
the FCC’s proceeding, see Anne L. Kim, FTC Commissioners Also Talk Net Neutrality at 
CES, Roll Call Blog (Jan. 8, 2015), http://blogs.rollcall.com/technocrat/ftc-
commissioners-also-talk-net-neutrality-at-ces (noting views of two other Commissioners 
who disagree with the view that the FTC, alone, can address network neutrality through the 
antitrust laws). 
46 Rosch, Some Reflections on the Future of the Internet, supra note 45, at 3 (“I am glad 
that the FCC, instead of the FTC, is handling this hot potato.”). 
47 Letter on Ex Parte Filing, supra note 4, at 3. 
48 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 5, 41, 49–50 (2015). 
49 See, e.g., Gautham Nagesh, Net Neutrality: How White House Thwarted FCC Chief, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2015 (“The president’s words swept aside . . . months of work by [FCC 
Chairman] Wheeler toward a compromise.”). 
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between the two regulatory commissions, the White House’s 
comments seem to have done more than advocate for (and achieve) a 
particular policy outcome. They further helped to resolve the conflict 
between the FTC and the FCC. Although the comments do not 
explicitly address the interagency competition, the White House’s 
proposal favoring the common carrier designation had the significant 
effect of truncating the FTC’s authority to sanction broadband carriers 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act,50 and likely limited the scope of 
permissible antitrust enforcement.51 That is, the White House’s 
intervention implicitly favored FCC oversight for network neutrality 
matters. 
 In some respects, this is unremarkable. The executive routinely 
adjudicates interagency disputes through a variety of institutional 
mechanisms.52 In some cases, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
coordinate among agencies with overlapping jurisdiction.53 In other 
instances, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
informally mediates disputes among agencies, or issues formal 
decisions that resolve interagency conflicts.54 
 Aside from exercising control through OMB, OIRA, or OLC, 
specialized offices within the White House will sometimes become 
directly involved in an interagency conflict.55 For example, the White 
50 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (excepting common carriers from the FTC’s jurisdiction). 
51 See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007) (interpreting 
regulatory regime as “implicitly precluding the application of the antitrust laws”); Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411–12 (2004). 
52 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173–81 (2012) (“describ[ing] some of the well-established 
coordination instruments that are uniquely available to the President, including centralized 
White House review.”). 
53 See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2217, 2298 (2005) (“The most important player in coordinating regulatory action 
across multiple executive agencies may be [OIRA] . . . .”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 52, 
at 1178. 
54 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 52, at 1175-76 (“[T]he President relies in the 
normal course on the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in DOJ to help resolve jurisdictional 
disputes among agencies.”). 
55 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths 
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1849 (2013) (“In important but unusual cases, a 
White House policy office will initiate a process . . . to help coordinate discussions . . . Such 
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House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) interceded 
into a dispute between the Patent and Trademark Office and the 
National Institutes of Health regarding the patentability of DNA 
molecules.56 Indeed, the intervention into the dispute over network 
neutrality fits this latter mold precisely: Accounts of the White 
House’s involvement in the network neutrality proceeding describe 
how OSTP took a particular interest in network neutrality and 
coordinated policy discussions among interested participants.57 
 Notably, however, both the FCC and FTC are independent 
agencies, while the PTO and NIH are executive agencies. This is a 
potentially important distinction: While the “traditional description of 
an executive agency is one that is subject to plenary control,” 
independent agencies are typically thought to be protected from such 
influence.58 To be sure, there is some precedent for executive 
intervention in interagency disputes that include independent 
commissions.59 Such cases are relatively rare, however, and the White 
House’s intervention into the network neutrality proceeding offers a 
unique and potentially important example of executive coordination 
among independent regulators.60 
a process is especially likely to occur if an initiative is a presidential priority or otherwise of 
interest to the President and his closest advisers.”). 
56 See Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 111, 114–15 (2013); Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: 
Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1253 n.64, 1259 n.94 
(2012); see also Sunstein, supra note 55, at 1849. 
57 Nagesh, supra note 49. 
58 Datla & Revesz, supra note 9, at 813; see also id. at 774; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 52, 
at 1175, 1179 n.237 (“Presidents are typically less able to direct action by independent 
agencies than action by executive agencies . . . .”). 
59 Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 426 U.S. 1, 24 n.20 (1976) (describing the 
allocation of authority between the EPA and the Atomic Energy Commission—now the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)) (citing AEC-EPA Memoranda of Understanding, 
38 Fed. Reg. 24936, 32965 (1973)); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding the independent NRC’s moratorium, 
imposed in deference to President Carter’s stated nonproliferation strategy of informal 
rulemaking and related licensing proceedings involving the recycling of spent nuclear fuel); 
see also Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 183 (2011); Datla 
& Revesz, supra note 9, at 824 n.313.  
60 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 9, at 823-24; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 52, at 1174 
(“The President may be able to mediate among agencies faced with related and interacting 
delegations to steer the policy course he prefers, in some cases even exerting influence over 
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III. A SENSIBLE POLICY CHOICE 
 The White House’s response to the FCC’s regulatory proceeding 
thus not only advocated for a particular outcome, but also had the 
important effect of quelling an interagency jurisdictional dispute. At 
least one important question emerges from the White House’s 
intervention:61 Was the choice to allocate authority over network 
neutrality to the FCC, and, thereby, rely on communications 
regulation, sound? Focusing especially on the rule banning conduct 
that favors affiliated entities, the decision to rely on ex ante regulation, 
rather than ex post antitrust enforcement, seems a sensible policy 
choice. 
 The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order explicitly bans conduct that 
“favor[s] some [Internet] traffic over other traffic . . . to benefit an 
affiliated entity.”62 That is, the new rules prevent Comcast (for 
example) from favoring services that it owns, such as Hulu,63 at the 
expense of competitors, such as Netflix. This type of competition 
concern, that carriers would favor the traffic of their own affiliates to 
exclude competitors,64 has long served as one motivation for network 
neutrality regulation.65 
independent agencies, which otherwise tend to elude his control.”); see also id. at 1201 
n.312. 
61 Several other questions emerge from the White House’s intervention, including whether 
such executive coordination among independent agencies is lawful or desirable. E.g., Datla 
& Revesz, supra note 9, at 774 (arguing that “the President can constitutionally take any 
action with respect to independent agencies that he could with respect to the executive 
agencies unless a statutory provision says otherwise[]”); see also Watts, supra note 10, at 
46-47 (“Obama’s overt involvement [in the network neutrality proceeding] furthers notions 
of political accountability and transparency . . . .”); Shane, supra note 10 (“The FCC's 
independent agency status does not by itself make White House contacts improper.”). I set 
these matters to one side for the purposes of this essay, noting only that the network 
neutrality example demonstrates that such executive influence is (at least occasionally) 
empirically observable. 
62 47 C.F.R. § 8.9(b); 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 3, at ¶ 18; see also 2014 Open 
Internet NPRM, supra note 2, at ¶ 126 (“[W]e propose to adopt a rebuttable presumption 
that a broadband provider’s exclusive (or effectively exclusive) arrangement prioritizing 
service to an affiliate would be commercially unreasonable.”). 
63 NBCUniversal: NBCUniversal Cable Networks, COMCAST, 
http://corporate.comcast.com/our-company/businesses/nbcuniversal (last visited May 16, 
2015) (“Among the diverse digital media properties of NBCUniversal [is] . . . Hulu . . . .”). 
64 See Tejas N. Narechania, Network Nepotism and the Market for Content Delivery, 67 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 29–30 (2014). For a sampling of works that explore exclusion as 
a competition concern more generally, see Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of 
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 For example, the FCC’s first significant network neutrality 
decision sanctioned Madison River, a telephone company, for 
blocking online voice applications (using voice-over-Internet-
Protocol, or VoIP, technology) that competed with its existing 
services.66 AT&T has likewise restricted the availability of competing 
VoIP services.67 On other occasions, mobile operators have, after 
affiliating with one mobile payment services provider, blocked access 
to competing services.68 More recently, the Department of Justice 
investigated allegations that broadband carriers used data caps (i.e., 
limits on consumer use) to advantage affiliated cable television 
products and their Internet-enabled counterparts.69 Additionally, 
Verizon once restricted third-party applications that competed with its 
own mobile data offerings.70  
 This varied set of examples, stretching over a decade and across 
both wireline and wireless providers, suggests that broadband 
carriers, in fact, seek to discriminate among applications to favor 
affiliated services. That is, the possibility of exclusion presents a real 
Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in How the 
Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. 
Antitrust 141 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core 
Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527 (2013); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel 
Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013); and Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE 
L.J. 209 (1986). 
65 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142 (2003) (“Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to 
help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or 
applications becoming available to end-users.”). 
66 Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005) (order). 
67 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17925 (2010) (report and order) 
[hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order]; see also Free Press Concerned About AT&T’s Plan 
to Charge for FaceTime, FREE PRESS, July 17, 2012, https://www.freepress.net/press-
release/98878/free-press-concerned-about-att%E2%80%99s-plan-charge-facetime. 
68 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 648 (citing 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 67, at 
17925); David Goldman, Verizon Blocks Google Wallet, CNNMONEY, Dec. 6, 2011, 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/06/technology/verizon_blocks_google_wallet. 
69 Thomas Catan & Amy Schatz, U.S. Probes Cable for Limits on Net Video, WALL ST. J., 
June 13, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230344420457746295116638462
4. 
70 Cellco P’ship, 27 FCC Rcd. 8932, 8936 (2012) (order). 
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concern for those that seek to compete with the applications and 
services offered by network operators and broadband carriers 
themselves.71 
 Despite this set of empirical examples suggesting—in the context 
of broadband applications—that the threat of foreclosure presents a 
serious threat to fair competition, antitrust has tended to “downplay[] 
exclusion,”72 and, thereby, tends to be relatively permissive with 
regard to the market arrangements that threaten to impose such 
competitive harms.73 
 As noted above, however, it is empirically demonstrable that 
broadband carriers seek to profitably discriminate against competitors 
to favor affiliates. Indeed, courts and scholars have explained that 
such exclusionary conduct can be lucrative for platform owners, such 
as broadband carriers, that leverage their gatekeeper power to hinder 
new innovations while making space for affiliated services.74 The costs 
imposed by such anticompetitive conduct are significant: Because 
many broadband applications benefit from network effects and from 
first-mover advantages, exclusionary conduct can give the favored 
rival a significant advantage while stunting economic growth and 
innovation more broadly.75 Because antitrust’s sieve may fail to catch 
important instances of exclusionary conduct,76 a strong regulatory 
presumption against affiliate-based exclusionary behavior is well-
71 Cf. James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting Vertical Deals Through the Agencies, 
29 ANTITRUST 10, 12–15 (Summer 2015) (describing examples of FTC and Department of 
Justice action in cases presenting analogous threats to competition). 
72 Baker, supra note 64, at 531. 
73 Wright BPCW Speech, supra note 8, at 9-10; Baker, supra note 64, at 534-35; see also 
generally Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of 
Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991). 
74 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646-49 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next 
Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 73 (2003); see also Baker, supra 
note 64, at 561-62; Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 413 (2009). 
75 Baker, supra note 64, at 559-62. 
76 See, e.g., FTC, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (June 2007) (Jon 
Leibowitz, Comm’r, concurring) (“[T]here is little chance that antitrust would prevent such 
a scheme [as the one in Madison River case] except after a ‘rule of reason’ analysis, which 
— at least in these types of cases — is likely to be drawn out, uncertain and expensive.”). 
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grounded in theory and experience, given the particular 
characteristics of broadband carriers and related services.77 
CONCLUSION 
 The Federal Communications Commission’s network neutrality 
proceedings garnered interest and commentary from a wide set of 
policymakers, technology companies, and scholars—among others. 
Some of the most notable and salient comments, however, came from 
within the administration itself. The FTC warned that the FCC could 
truncate FTC regulatory jurisdiction by choosing to invoke its 
authority under Title II of the Communications Act, setting the stage 
for an interagency battle for the authority to regulate network 
neutrality. The White House, however, advocated strongly in favor of 
the FCC’s Title II powers. Thus, the White House’s intervention not 
only proponed a particular policy outcome, but also mediated an 
interagency dispute among independent agencies. Moreover, 
prophylactic regulation by the FCC better addresses the harms 
historically targeted by network neutrality rules, given the dynamics of 
competition in broadband and related industries.  
77 Stated slightly different, even if many such market arrangements (often, vertical 
agreements) are efficient in general, such arrangements with broadband carriers tend 
strongly to be anticompetitive. Thus, it is the limited context in which the regulatory rule 
applies that justifies the imposition of an ex ante restraint. Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 
441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979) (per se rule appropriate where conduct “always or almost always 
tend to restrict competition”).  
It is also particularly notable that most, if not all, broadband carriers have explicitly 
disavowed any interest in engaging in the types of prioritization that might favor an 
affiliated service. E.g., Alina Selyukh, Comcast, AT&T Seek to Reassure on No Plans For 
Internet 'Fast Lanes', REUTERS, Oct. 30, 2014 (noting letters from AT&T, Comcast, and 
Verizon to Senator Leahy disavowing interest in forms of traffic prioritization that would 
violate network neutrality rules). This fact would seem to suggest that the error cost 
calculation of a flat regulatory prohibition cuts decidedly in favor of such a rule (because 
the rate of Type I [false positive] error should be zero). 

